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All the world's a stage,  
And all the men and women merely players.  
They have their exits and their entrances,  
And one man in his time plays many parts,  
His acts being seven ages. At first the infant,  
Mewling and puking in the nurse's arms.  
Then the whining school-boy with his satchel  
And shining morning face, creeping like snail  
Unwillingly to school.1 
 
Would I be wildly mistaken in speculating that the school-boy’s 
snailish pace had something to do with an essay hastily 
completed as the sun rose that morning? Or perhaps with the 
prospect of receiving the mark for that essay several weeks 
later? For the unwilling school-boy or school-girl the essay can 
seem at best merely a joyless form of assessment and at worst a 
vicious form of punishment. And university study, especially in 
the Humanities and Social Sciences, offers no escape, for the 
essay retains a central place in the marking regime at 
universities around the globe. A more positive perspective on 
the essay probably requires taking it out of the classroom, 
where its merits and joys can be more readily acknowledged. 
Virginia Woolf, for example, in ‘The Modern Essay’, writes 
that  
 
the principle which controls [the essay] is simply that it 
should give pleasure; the desire which impels us when we 
take it from the shelf is simply to receive pleasure. It should 
lay us under a spell with its first word, and we should only 
wake, refreshed, with its last.2 
 
Woolf realises that during this rapture readers might 
experience ‘amusement, surprise, interest, and indignation’, but 
judges that, ultimately, ‘we must never be roused’. Better this 
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than the surly response of the student, of course, but Woolf’s 
validation of the pleasure principle raises another criticism of 
the essay: that it is belle-lettrist, ephemeral, insignificant. She 
herself recognises the dangers of the overly ornamental work, 
where ‘words coagulate together into frozen sprays which, like 
grapes on a Christmas-tree, glitter for a single night, but are 
dusty and garish the day after’.3  But can essays be more than 
punishment or briefly glittering grapes? Woolf certainly 
thought so, not surprisingly given her considerable strengths as 
an essayist. But tellingly, despite the massive academic industry 
founded on her work, Woolf’s essays have received little 
critical attention. As Rachel Bowlby noted as late as 1992, 
while Woolf the novelist is accepted as a major modernist 
figure, Woolf the essayist is ‘little known, and often considered 
merely as an adjunct to the first’.4 Woolf’s case exemplifies a 
broad academic neglect of the essay as a distinct form until 
relatively recently, when the essay began to receive more 
sustained treatment. Ironically, for a form over four hundred 
years old, recent critics and theorists have reconceived the essay 
as inherently subversive, possibly even postmodern. 
One means of considering this radicalised, pomo essay lies in 
understanding that history, an approach which entails 
considering the essay not so much as a thing, but as a process. 
Michel Montaigne first brought together a collection of short 
discursive prose pieces in 1580, and in naming them ‘essais’, 
from the French root word for ‘attempt’, he signals that the 
activity of inquiry undertaken in the form might be ongoing. In 
this sense, an essay by its very nature is incomplete. 
Incompleteness might be seen as an admission of failure, or as a 
sign of deficiency. Nearly two hundred years after Montaigne, 
Samuel Johnson’s definition of the essay as ‘a loose sally of the 
mind, an irregular, undigested piece, not a regular and orderly 
performance’ sounds almost dismissive.5 Yet Montaigne’s 
modest term carries with it an awareness of the shortcomings of 
the medieval certainties, certainties which an emerging 
Humanism was directly challenging in the 16th century. That 
challenge, too, was an ongoing process, exemplified by the fact 
that Montaigne repeatedly revised his essays, as well as adding 
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to their total number. There ‘is no such thing as a definitive 
edition’ of Montaigne’s essays, explains M.A. Screech, the 
editor of a recent edition. ‘One has to choose,’ he adds, the 
Essays being ‘a prime example of the expanding book’.6 Here, 
incompleteness connotes an exploratory openness, a refusal to 
pretend that the last word can be said. Carl Klaus has described 
Montaigne’s essays as ‘a means of thinking on paper’7, and the 
same attitude is present on the essays of the first great English 
exponent of the essay, Francis Bacon. Bacon’s first volume of 
essays appeared in 1597. Further editions, with numerous 
additions and alterations, appeared in 1612 and 1625, recording 
Bacon’s reflective intelligence over a quarter of a century. 
Incompleteness, then, can signal the questing mind.  
I shall return to the question of incompleteness later, but 
before doing so I want to look at the word ‘I’, for it is central to 
the vigour and flavour of many essays. The student essayist is 
often warned off using the personal pronoun, perhaps under the 
pretence that ‘I’ is too personal, and thus conveys less gravitas 
than the royal ‘we’. Montaigne himself seems to have had no 
doubt as to the correct approach: ‘I myself am the subject of my 
book’, he announces boldly in the ‘Note to the Reader’. 
M.A.Screech declares this ‘a revolutionary decision’, for, ‘[i]n 
the history of the known world only a handful of authors had 
ever broken the taboo against writing primarily about oneself, 
as an ordinary man’.8 Montaigne understands the implications 
of this approach: 
 
If my design had been to seek the favour of the world I 
would have decked myself out better and presented myself in 
a studied gait. Here I want to be seen in my simple, natural, 
everyday fashion, without striving or artifice: for it is my 
own self that I am painting. Here, drawn from life, you will 
read of my defects and my native form so far as respect for 
social convention allows. . . 9 
 
In placing himself at the centre of the essay process, Montaigne 
offers himself for criticism. For though he draws deeply from 
the ancient wisdom contained in books, he does not hide behind 
Sydney Studies 
4 
that wisdom, or use it as a false authority for what are, 
ultimately, his own opinions and conclusions.  
The personal viewpoint of the essay, then, can offer the 
reader an explicitly subjective conception and representation of 
the world. Compare this to the scientific paper or the political 
treatise, which purport to give an objective account of reality. 
The importance and utility of the essay’s personal note is 
evident in the work of one of the major English essayists of the 
twentieth century, George Orwell. In ‘Why I Write’, Orwell 
famously presents four motives that he considers drive the 
writer: sheer egoism; aesthetic enthusiasm; historical impulse; 
political purpose. The last three seem to have more a social than 
a personal aspect, but Orwell explains aesthetic enthusiasm as 
the individual’s perception of beauty and the desire to share this 
with others; historical impulse as the wish ‘to see things as they 
are’, and political purpose as the ‘desire to push the world in a 
certain direction, to alter other people’s ideas of the kinds of 
society that they should strive after’.10 These personal impulses 
fuse with Orwell’s wish to write ‘because there is some lie I 
want to expose, some fact to which I want to draw attention’.11 
But this overtly public stance is underpinned by an intensely 
personal foundation: 
I am not able, and I do not want, completely to abandon the 
world-view that I acquired in childhood. So long as I remain 
alive and well I shall continue to feel strongly about prose 
style, to love the surface of the earth, and to take pleasure in 
solid objects and scraps of useless information. It is no use 
trying to suppress that side of myself.12  
 
For those who view Orwell primarily as a political writer, these 
statements are surprisingly personal. But, particularly in his 
essays, the personal invigorates and directly informs the 
political. 
A small selection from Orwell’s massive output of essays 
substantiates the case. One of his earliest pieces, ‘A Hanging’, 
published under his real name of Eric Blair, traces the thoughts 
of an colonial observer at the hanging of a Hindu prisoner in 
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imperial Burma. Biographers dispute whether or not Orwell (or 
Blair) witnessed a hanging,13 but David Lodge argues that ‘it 
doesn’t really matter’.14  For Lodge, the central paragraph of the 
essay is that in which the narrator comes to realise the 
implications of executing another human being. The ‘I’ of the 
essay, seeing the condemned man step aside to avoid a puddle 
on his way to the gallows, immediately understands ‘the 
mystery, the unspeakable wrongness, of cutting short a life 
when it is in full tide. The man was not dying, he was alive just 
as we were alive’.15 By refiring the brutal and brutalising death 
of the prisoner as a moment of personal illumination, shame and 
horror for the narrator, Rowel manages to humanise the 
anonymous criminal and to condemn the institution that 
perpetrates such punishment. While the post-colonial critic 
would probably explore the shortcomings of the essay’s 
Eurocentric perspective, the moral force and political critique of 
‘A Hanging’ depends on the colonialist narrator’s self-
perception and of his place in the imperial system carrying out 
the hanging. 
A very different approach is taken in ‘Some Thoughts On 
The Common Toad’. In this essay, Orwell’s own experience 
and observations, sparked by the onset of spring, are 
fundamental to the general argument that enjoyment of the 
cycles of the natural world are beyond the control even of 
bureaucrats and dictators. Here, the link between personal and 
political is more overt: 
 
I think that by retaining one’s childhood love of such things 
as trees, fishes, butterflies and--to return to my first instance-
-toads, one makes a peaceful and decent future a little more 
probable, and that by preaching the doctrine that nothing is to 
be admired except steel and concrete, one merely makes it a 
little surer that human beings will have no outlet for their 
surplus energy except in hatred and leader worship.16 
 
Orwell’s individual experience and memory help him to 
appreciate the natural world, and to make a larger argument 
rejecting dehumanising social and political forces. 
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Still another personal concern, the misuse of words and its 
effect on public discourse, prompts one of Orwell’s most 
famous and influential essays, ‘Politics and the English 
Language’. Here he attacks the pretensions and sloppiness of 
writing by intellectuals, arguing that faults in written expression 
cross-pollinate with similar flaws in thinking. The result is 
thinking and writing which is poor at best, and corrupt and 
corrupting at worst. Yet the essay is not simply a catalogue of 
abuses, for Orwell argues that the decline in expression can be 
halted: ‘one needs rules that one can rely on when instinct fails. 
I think the following rules will cover most cases’. The rules he 
offers still merit consideration, but my point here is that 
Orwell’s broad social point develops from a personal feeling 
that language is being misused. Not that he himself is free from 
sin. As he admits, ‘[l]ook back through this essay, and for 
certain you will find that I have again and again committed the 
very faults I am protesting against’.17 Like the essay form itself, 
the process of correcting decadent speech and thought can only 
be an attempt--absolutely necessary, but never complete. And it 
requires not only thoughtful writing, but also attentive reading, 
reading which ‘hears’ the redundant phrase, the pretentious 
diction, the meaningless word, and judges the argument 
accordingly. 
These three essays exemplify the centrality of the personal 
aspect to Orwell’s essay output, as well as some of the ways in 
which he employs the ‘I’. They certainly do not exhaust the 
possibilities, for all 41 of Orwell’s essays in the Penguin Essays 
collection are written from the first person perspective. Their 
titles alone indicative of the breadth of subject matter examined: 
‘Charles Dickens’; ‘Shooting an Elephant’; ‘Marrakech’; 
‘Antisemitism in Britain’; ‘Boys’ Weeklies’; ‘Decline of the 
English Murder’; ‘Reflections on Gandhi’. In each, though in 
different ways, the ‘I’ functions as point of reference, as self-
critical observer, polemicist, humorist, cultural analyst, political 
commentator, literary critic. The personal essay offers liberating 
possibilities, allowing for short targeted arguments on an 
infinite range of topics. No wonder that when Orwell began his 
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own column for the Left-wing journal, Tribune, he called it ‘As 
I Please’. Graham Good argues that Orwell’s politicisation of 
the essay in fact reinvigorated a form which had (in 1930s 
England) become cosy and whimsical:  
no longer would the old gentlemanly (or ladylike, as Virginia 
Woolf saw her own early work) tone be available. . . .For 
him the  essayistic attitude, the offering of independent views 
based on individual thought and experience, came to have an 
immense political significance.18 [original emphasis] 
 
Orwell was not alone in writing politicised essays in the 
1930s,19 but his essays do counter the criticism of the essay as 
irredeemably belle-lettrist. 
Traditionally, though, the more ‘gentlemanly’ personal essay 
has been seen as the highest achievement of the form, and, for 
some, the only variant truly worthy of the label. Hugh Walker, 
in 1915, exasperated by the many pieces of literature classified 
(or classifying themselves) as essays, argues that ‘a term so 
elastic means little or nothing, just because it means anything. If 
we can call Locke’s great work [An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding] and Lamb’s dissertation on roast pigs alike 
essays, we have emptied the word of content’.20 Walker deals 
with the dilemma by distinguishing between personal essays, or 
‘essays par excellence’, and compositions which are short and 
relatively incomplete, and which have customarily been called 
essays. For Walker, such essays ‘do not strictly belong to a 
separate literary form: the historical essay is an incomplete 
history, the philosophical essay might expand into a treatise’.21 
Incompleteness clearly is the mark of deficiency, and true 
essays could ‘under no circumstances expand into treatises; 
they are complete in themselves’. Montaigne and Francis Bacon 
are given as the representative practitioners of this type, but, as 
I have already shown, both these writers repeatedly reworked 
individual essays. To cope with this problem in terms of Bacon, 
Walker treats his early versions as a kind of apprentice work, in 
which ‘the connexions [sic] are not worked out and expressed, 
but are implicit and can be supplied by the intelligence of the 
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alert reader’.22 As with Orwell over three hundred years later, 
the alert reader is required. But incompleteness cannot be 
dismissed as easily as Walker might like. 
Mary Hamilton Law also offers a traditional view, based on a 
hierarchy in which the rather whimsical personal essay 
dominates. For her, the ‘highest type of all, the one that is 
most certainly to be classed as pure literature among the fine 
arts is the personal or the familiar essay’.23 Such essays are 
defined by their overt subjectivity: 
 
personality is its keynote. . . .The familiar essay conveys the 
moods, the fantasies and whims, the chance reflections and 
random observations of the essayist.24 
Again, Montaigne and Lamb are taken as exemplary personal 
essayists. Law judges writing that is ‘merely topical, ephemeral, 
journalistic or technical’ as unworthy of the label ‘essay’. These 
pieces are mere ‘articles, ‘papers’, and treatises which burden 
our current periodicals, both popular and learned, and which 
flourish today and tomorrow are cast into the oven’.25  One 
problem with this means of distinguishing between the ‘purely’ 
literary and the journalistic is that the whimsy of an essayist 
such a Lamb has passed its sell-by date; he is little read today. 
The essay can still be used as a butterfly net to catch chance 
reflections and random observations of latter-day Lambs, but in 
the hands of such sophisticated modern practitioners as Susan 
Sontag, Salman Rushdie and Gore Vidal, essays function as 
sharp scalpel for the dissection of the body politic. 
Take Rushdie, by way of example. The essay collection 
Imaginary Homelands, published in 1991 (when Rushdie was 
deep in the shadows of a fatwa) records Rushdie’s probing 
critiques of a variety of subjects during the 1980s and early 
1990s. Some are primarily literary, or chart the (to use a 
Rushdie-ism) ‘chutnified’ histories of India and Pakistan; others 
refocus attention back to the colonial and post-colonial situation 
of Britain. Still others try to integrate these apparently disparate 
topics, as in ‘‘Commonwealth Literature’ Does Not Exist’, in 
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which Rushdie argues ‘the folly of trying to contain writers 
inside passports’.26 That essay ends with the view that 
the English language ceased to be  the sole possession of the 
English some time ago. Perhaps ‘Commonwealth Literature’ 
was invented to delay the day when we rough beasts [the 
formerly colonised] actually slouch into Bethlehem. In which 
case, it’s time to admit that the centre cannot hold.27  
 
What is striking, but also representative of many of the essays 
in Imaginary Homelands, is the sense that the ‘end’ of the essay 
merely marks a point in a larger or longer process of political 
and social activity, in this case the ongoing construction of a 
future Britain. That desire for a breaking down of political and 
cultural restrictions is nowhere more poignant than in the essay 
‘Is Nothing Sacred?’, in which Rushdie argues the value of 
literature’s open engagement with ideas and diversity in the 
face of religious intolerance. ‘The only privilege literature 
deserves,’ he writes, ‘and this privilege it requires in order to 
exist--is the privilege of being the arena of discourse, the place 
where the struggle of languages can be acted out’.28 Acted out, 
but not played out, for the ‘arena of discourse’ is a never-
ending gabfest. ‘Is Nothing Sacred?’ adds to that discourse, and 
in doing so keeps it active, or actively incomplete.  
Some literary critics have taken incompleteness as a sign of 
deficiency, but it seems truer to argue for the essay as 
inherently, and dynamically, incomplete. And it is in this sense 
that the essay as a form has attracted more recent scholars and 
commentators. For them, the essay’s incompleteness has a 
subversive quality, and, to paraphrase Jean-Francois Lyotard, 
suggests, or perhaps enacts, a suspicion of grand narratives. In 
fact, Lyotard has stated explicitly (as far as any words of 
Lyotard can be seen as explicit) that ‘[i]t seems to me that the 
essay (Montaigne) is postmodern’.29  But the models for much 
of the recent rethinking of the essay are precursors of both 
Lyotard and the postmodern. Georg Lukacs and Theodor 
Adorno separately propose that, rather than a belle-lettrist 
record of whims and observations, the essay as a form might be 
better seen as an activity. In considering the judgement made in 
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the essay, Lukacs suggests that ‘the essential, the value-
determining thing about it is not the verdict (as is the case with 
the system) but the process of judging’.30  And in this process 
of judging, the essay becomes, for Adorno, the ‘critical form 
par excellence. . .the critique of ideology’.31 In this guise the 
essay is a potentially subversive force for Adorno: ‘the 
innermost form of the essay is heresy. By transgressing the 
orthodoxy of thought, something becomes visible in the object 
which it is orthodoxy’s purpose to keep invisible’.32 
It is in these terms, and often on the basis of the ideas of 
Lukacs and Adorno, that the essay has come back into some 
sort of scholarly favour in the last decade or so. There are 
several reasons for this, including the notion that the 
incompleteness of the essay harmonises with the postmodern 
wariness of totalising thought. R. Lane Kauffmann, for 
example, plays up the subversive and contemporary activity of 
‘essaying’, suggesting that ‘the historical conflict between 
fragmentary and totalising modes of thought--between essay 
and system’ describes the ‘crisis of contemporary thought’.33 
Or, you could argue, the liberation of contemporary thought 
from the need to provide totalising answers. The anxiety that 
might come from open ended questioning also enables the 
open-ended discourse favoured by Salman Rushdie. And the 
fact that the essay need not prove its case, in the way that would 
be expected of the treatise, allows it to be a potent polemical 
weapon. The ‘complete’ thesis must prove its case definitively, 
while the ‘incomplete’ essay can make telling points without 
having to justify each claim. This activity of itself is not, of 
course, postmodern--the essay has from its inception been a 
form of active engagement. John O’Neill, writing on 
Montaigne, argues that the essay from the very beginning has 
been ‘an experiment in the community of truth, and not the 
packaging of knowledge ruled by definitions and operations’.34  
The view that the essay form challenges totalising authority 
been taken up by some feminist scholars, who see the essay as 
an ideal form for presenting subversive views. The editors of 
the collection, The Politics of the Essay: Feminist Perspectives, 
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argue that ‘unsystematised nature’ of the essay form, ‘its 
spontaneous and almost accidental quality, its assumed 
opposition to doctrinaire, disciplinary thinking, its focus on 
personal experience, its cultivation of diversity, its stress on 
particularity, its ‘happy inheritance of meaninglessness’’ all 
suggest that the essay is ‘perfectly designed for feminist 
projects’.35 One such ‘project’, far pre-dating this collection, is 
Virginia Woolf’s ‘A Room of One’s Own’, first published in 
1929. In a recent introduction to a new edition, Michele Barrett 
argues that this essay, along with ‘Three Guineas’, constitute 
Woolf’s ‘two major political works’. She adds that the teacher 
casting around for works on women’s writing can be confident 
that students will find ‘a solid and well-supported argument that 
can be discussed on its merits’.36  Oddly, this contradicts Woolf 
herself, who, on the very first page of the essay, admits: ‘I 
should never be able to fulfil what is, I understand, the first 
duty of a lecturer --to hand you after an hour’s discourse a 
nugget of truth to wrap between the pages of your notebooks 
and keep on the mantelpiece for ever’.37 Woolf makes clear that 
the proposed topic for the lectures, ‘Women and Fiction’, lies 
beyond the scope of easy conclusions. In making this point, and 
in the subsequent argument put forward, Woolf draws upon the 
generic conventions of the essay. ‘A Room of One’s Own’ is a 
highly personal kaleidoscope of thoughts, experiences, research 
(real and bogus), speculations and observations. And it ends, as 
one might expect of an essay, by projecting: into a future in 
which the fictional sister of Shakespeare will be born. 
Though ‘A Room of One’s Own’ ends positively, if 
fantastically, Woolf does not set out to lull her audience. 
Instead, near the beginning of the essay, having established that 
she will offer no easy solutions and conclusions, she adopts an 
approach that is both tentative and provocative, offering up a 
challenge to her initial listeners and to her eventual readers: 
Lies will flow from my lips, but there may perhaps be some 
truth mixed up with them; it is for you to seek out this truth 
and to decide whether any part of it is worth keeping. If not, 
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you will of course throw the whole thing into the waste-
paper basket and forget all about it.38 
 
Again, Woolf draws upon the inherent ability of the essay, and 
the essayist, to dodge the demand for definitive proof. This 
freedom the genre offers necessarily involves the reader in 
active engagement with the text. As I have suggested, the 
‘experiments in truth’ O’Neill considers central to Montaigne’s 
essays determine that those essays ‘are unwelcome to the 
passive reader. They require that the reader share in the author’s 
activity’.39 There are problems with this readerly ‘freedom’, of 
course, for as Claire De Obaldia realises, ‘the reader’s invitation 
to interpret is an invitation to the deeply ‘unsettling’ 
experiences of having his conclusions declared premature or 
invalid’.40 In other words, the incompleteness of the essay, at 
the same time as it opens up possibilities for readers, offers no 
means by which the reader might have those conclusions 
validated. The price of freedom, at least in terms of the essay, is 
eternal indeterminacy. For some, this can lead to frustration, to 
a sense that reading essays is not worth the effort required. 
Whining schoolgirls and boys might feel the same about writing 
essays. For others, who view incompleteness not as a 
deficiency, but as a stimulus to further thought, the essay 
provides one of the most flexible forms by which fresh and 
invigorating exploration can take place.  And who knows what 
the reader might discover; that is the challenge and the pleasure 
the essay has already provided for centuries, and will continue 
to provide for the inquisitive and the adventurous. 
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